Industrial Concentration and the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis : A Critical Evaluation on the Basis of Effective Competition
After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of Germany a <I>reassessment of the significance</I> of this instrument of antitrust policy seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the <I>reorientation of merger</I> <I>control pol...
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Μορφή: | Κεφάλαιο βιβλίου |
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Bern
Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group
2018
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Διαθέσιμο Online: | Get Fullteks DOAB: description of the publication |
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024 | 7 | |a 10.3726/b13907 |c doi | |
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100 | 1 | |a Rittaler, Jan B. |4 auth | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Industrial Concentration and the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis : A Critical Evaluation on the Basis of Effective Competition |
260 | |a Bern |b Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group |c 2018 | ||
300 | |a 1 electronic resource (422 p.) | ||
506 | 0 | |a Open Access |2 star |f Unrestricted online access | |
520 | |a After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of Germany a <I>reassessment of the significance</I> of this instrument of antitrust policy seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the <I>reorientation of merger</I> <I>control policy in the United States</I> which has been - in its original version - the model for the German merger control system.<BR> Concerning merger control, the reorientation is characterized by the notion that the <I>structure-conduct-performance paradigm</I> which has dominated U.S. antitrust for a quarter of a century is imprecise or even incorrect and «that bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness.»<BR> This makes the fundamental question arise of whether the German merger control system is still up to date in terms of the underlying market theory and of whether the <I>German Act Against</I> <I>Restraints of Competition</I> needs a reorientation towards aspects of market conduct and performance instead of market structure by means of a Fifth Amendment. | ||
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546 | |a English | ||
650 | 7 | |a Economics |2 bicssc | |
650 | 7 | |a Jurisprudence & general issues |2 bicssc | |
653 | |a Analysis | ||
653 | |a Antitrust | ||
653 | |a Basis | ||
653 | |a Chicago | ||
653 | |a Competition | ||
653 | |a Concentration | ||
653 | |a Critical | ||
653 | |a Effective | ||
653 | |a Evaluation | ||
653 | |a Industrial | ||
653 | |a Rittaler | ||
653 | |a School | ||
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856 | 4 | 0 | |a www.oapen.org |u https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/36616 |7 0 |z DOAB: description of the publication |