Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943)

The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Aterrano, Marco Maria (auth)
Format: Book Chapter
Published: Napoli FedOA - Federico II University Press 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:Get Fullteks
DOAB: description of the publication
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
LEADER 03476naaaa2200325uu 4500
001 doab_20_500_12854_72016
005 20211004
020 |a 978-88-6887-012-6 
024 7 |a 10.6093/978-88-6887-012-6  |c doi 
041 0 |a Italian 
042 |a dc 
072 7 |a xxxx  |2 bicssc 
100 1 |a Aterrano, Marco Maria  |4 auth 
245 1 0 |a Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) 
260 |a Napoli  |b FedOA - Federico II University Press  |c 2017 
300 |a 1 electronic resource (285 p.) 
506 0 |a Open Access  |2 star  |f Unrestricted online access 
520 |a The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the ​elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. 
520 |a The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the ​elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. 
540 |a Creative Commons  |f https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/  |2 cc  |4 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
546 |a Italian 
650 7 |a xxxx  |2 bicssc 
653 |a World War II 
653 |a Mediterranean strategy 
653 |a Allied military planning 
653 |a Allied occupation of Italy 
653 |a Mediterranean Strategy 
653 |a Wartime Planning 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u http://www.fedoabooks.unina.it/index.php/fedoapress/catalog/book/39  |7 0  |z Get Fullteks 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/72016  |7 0  |z DOAB: description of the publication